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1. Introduction 
With the increasing availability of micro-level data sets, the observed differences between 
exporters and non-exporters has been investigated with respect to many dimensions, 
including productivity growth and price markups (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Tybout, 2003; 
Loecker, 2007; Bernard et al., 2007). However, the variations of firm-level environmental 
performance vis-à-vis the decision to export have received scant attention. Neither 
theoretical nor empirical studies provide a clear-cut perspective as to the relationship among 
export, productivity, and pollution. Part of the reason for this gap is the lack of longitudinal 
micro-level data sets containing both emissions and export data. This is unfortunate because 
environmental variations between exporters and non-exporters are arguably of growing 
importance as the world becomes more connected. For instance, policies which 
differentially affect various types of firms (either exporters or non-exporters) might have 
unintended environmental consequences, which can have implications for dealing with 
global climate change. 
In this paper, we explore the firm-level relationship between export status and 
environmental pollution. We start by developing a suitable theoretical model, to guide our 
empirical work, that relies on a Melitz-type trade model with heterogeneous firms (Melitz, 
2003). The model incorporates a pollution externality and allows firms to choose between 
two alternative technologies, one of which (the upgraded technology) is assumed to be an 
emission-saving technical change relative to the initial technology. Upgrading the technology 
requires extra fixed costs but yields lower marginal costs. This augmented model predicts 
that a continuum of heterogeneous firms is partitioned by technology upgrade choice and 
export status. Productive firms can earn enough revenues to cover the fixed costs of 
entering the export market, and thus select to be exporters. Moreover, only the most 
productive exporters upgrade to the emission-saving technology because they are the only 
ones with profitable incentives. Our conceptual framework gives rise to two testable 
predictions: (i) facility productivity is inversely related to emission intensity; and (ii) export 
status is negatively correlated with emission intensity. 
To test these predictions, we compiled a unique detailed facility-level dataset of the 
U.S. manufacturing industry for the years 2002, 2005, and 2008. The dataset is assembled 
from a variety of sources. The National Emission Inventory (NEI) of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provides facility-level criteria air pollution data for 
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2), Carbon Monoxide (CO), Ozone (O3), and Total Suspended 
Particulates (TSPs). The facility-level economic characteristics data are obtained from the 
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National Establishment Time Series database (NETS). These two databases are matched 
through the Data Universal Number System (DUNS), which is a unique facility identifier. 
To measure each facility’s exposure to environmental compliance costs, we further augment 
the dataset with pollutant-specific county nonattainment/attainment designations under the 
Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) legislation. 
The empirical strategy employed in this paper involves two main steps. First, a 
facility-level productivity parameter, interpreted as total factor productivity (TFP), is 
estimated as the residual of a production function that explains plant output by plant labor 
and industry characteristics. Second, given this estimated productivity parameter, we explore 
the correlation between exporting status and emission intensity on a pollutant-by-pollutant 
basis. To further validate the theoretical model that we postulate, we explore the impact of 
facility attributes on the probability of selection to export via a logistic regression of export 
status on measures of trade costs, facility TFP and a facility’s exposure to environmental 
regulations (i.e., the CAAA). 
Empirical findings are overall supportive of the theoretical predictions. For each 
criteria air pollutant, i.e., SO2, CO, O3, and TSPs, we find a significant negative correlation 
between the estimated facility productivity and emission intensity. Conditional on a facility’s 
estimated productivity and exposure to the CAAA, exporting facilities have lower emissions 
per value of sales than those non-exporting facilities in the same industry. The impact of 
export status on emission intensity is statistically significant for all pollutants we track. To 
take advantage of the variation of the environmental regulation across space and time, we 
also provide estimates of the impact of the CAAA on facility emission intensity. There is 
some evidence that polluters located in CO, O3, or TSPs nonattainment counties have lower 
emission intensity than those residing in attainment areas. 
This paper contributes to a growing literature in trade and the environment. With a 
theoretical foundation from Copeland and Taylor (1994, 1995), existing studies document 
the mixed environmental impacts of trade at the aggregate (e.g., country) level (Antweiler, 
Copeland, and Taylor, 2001; Jeffrey and Rose, 2005; Managi, Hibiki, and Tsurumi, 2009). 
These studies, however, do not account for firm heterogeneity and fail to capture the firms’ 
dynamic decisions of entry and exit. To address this problem, Cui (2012) incorporates 
technology adoption and environmental pollution into the Melitz framework. The analysis 
by Cui (2012) is theoretical in nature, studying the impacts of openness to trade and of the 
stringency of an environmental policy on clean technology adoption and firm dynamics. In 
this paper, we apply and extend his analytical framework to provide a theoretical guide for 
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the empirical investigation on the firm-level relationship between export status and 
environmental performance. 
Our empirical results contribute to the growing literature on the differences between 
exporters and non-exporters, in particular on the role of exporters in environmental 
performance. This literature has addressed the question using micro-level data sets from 
different countries and various measures of environmental behavior, and has identified 
robust findings in favor of exporters’ environmental advantage over non-exporters. Girma, 
Hanley, and Tintelnot (2008) use a measure of a four-point ordinal response, ranging from 
not at all important to very important, to two surveyed questions concerning the 
environmental impacts of innovation for UK firms. They find that exporters are more likely 
to denote innovation as having "high" or "very high" environmental effects than 
non-exporters. Using data from a panel of Irish manufacturing firms, Batrakova and Davies 
(2012) adopt fuel consumption as a proxy for firms’ environmental behavior, and show a 
negative correlation between export status and fuel expenditures for high fuel intensity firms. 
Similarly, Forslid, Okubo, and Ulltveit-Moe (2011) construct firm-level CO2 emissions using 
data on all types of fuel use, together with emission coefficients from Swedish firms. Their 
findings also suggest a negative correlation between an export dummy and CO2 emission 
intensity at the firm level. However, the self-reported answers to surveys and fuel input 
consumption, on which these three papers focus, may not adequately reflect firms’ 
environmental performance. 
A recent paper by Holladay (2010) investigates toxic pollution emissions from U.S. 
manufacturing establishments over the years 1990-2006. He finds that exporters emit less 
toxic emission than non-exporters when controlling for establishment output and industry 
characteristics. One aspect that our work shares with Holladay (2010) is the utilization of the 
NETS database. He matches plant-level toxic pollution emitters reported in the Toxic 
Release Inventory of the EPA with those covered in the NETS, whereas our paper sheds 
light on criteria air polluters collected in the NEI of the EPA. Another difference is that our 
study controls for the estimated facility productivity and the facility’s exposure to the CAAA. 
We also attempt to examine the export decision by using measures of trade costs.  
This paper is also related to a handful of empirical studies on the impacts of the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) and CAAA on industrial activities. Greenstone (2002) finds negative 
impacts of the CAA on the growth of polluting manufactures in nonattainment counties 
during the 1967-1987 period, i.e., the growth of employment, capital stock, and shipments. 
Additionally, others (Becker, 2010; Greenstone, List, and Syverson, 2010) have found that 
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the CAAA nonattainment designation is associated with drops in TFP for surviving 
polluting plants. Both of these studies use plant/establishment level data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau. Moreover, there is a long-lasting debate on whether the CAAA causes firms 
to reallocate within the country or even flee the country. Henderson (1996) and his 
follow-up study with Becker (Becker and Henderson, 2000) show that the O3 nonattainment 
regulation leads to the reallocation of polluting plants from more to less polluted areas 
during 1963-1992. Hana (2010), on the other hand, finds robust findings that the CAAA 
causes regulated U.S. based multinational firms to increase their foreign assets and outputs. 
When it comes to the impact of the regulation on pollution cleanup, Greenstone (2004) 
finds that the SO2 nonattainment designation plays a minor role in the dramatic decline of 
county-level ambient concentrations of SO2 during the 1969-1997 period. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the 
theoretical framework and derives the firm-level relationship among productivity, exporting 
status, and emission intensity. Section 3 introduces the CAAA regulation. Section 4 
describes the facility-level dataset constructed from a variety of data sources. Section 5 
provides the empirical strategy and presents the main results. The last section concludes. 
2. Theoretical Model 
This section incorporates environmental pollution and a choice of technology upgrade in 
the Melitz (2003) framework. This augmented model considers a world of two countries, 
home and foreign, with labor endowment L  and emission permit cap E . Each economy 
consists of a single monopolistically competitive industry in which firms, which differ in 
productivity, produce differentiated products. The government implements a domestic 
emission permit cap-and-trade program. Each firm uses labor as a primary input and 
generates emissions as byproducts. When necessary, our notation uses an asterisk to 
distinguish foreign country from home country variables necessary. Equations for the 
foreign country are omitted but are derived analogously.  
2.1. The Model 
At the beginning of each time period there is a large pool of identical firms prior to entry. 
To enter the market, each firm pays a time-invariant entrance fee of > 0ef  as an initial 
investment. The new entrant then draws the firm-specific productivity ϕ  from a common 
density distribution ϕ( )g  with a positive support on ∞(0, ) . Upon observing ϕ , each firm 
decides to either stay or exit the market immediately. If the firm stays, production requires 
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fixed production costs of > 0df . In addition, the firm chooses whether to upgrade to an 
emission-saving production technology. Upgrading the technology requires extra fixed costs 
of > 0f . The firm also decides whether to export, which entails additional fixed costs of 
> 0xf  and the standard iceberg form of variable cost (e.g., transportation or insurance 
costs), whereby τ > 1  units of a good must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive at 
destination. At the end of the period, the firm faces a constant probability δ ∈ (0,1)  of an 
idiosyncratic shock that forces it to exit, regardless of any prior decisions. All fixed costs, 
which are measured in labor units and thereafter sunk, are known to all potential entrants.   
The technology upgrade is modeled as a choice between two different technologies. 
The initial production technology is labeled as the “dirty” technology. The upgraded 
technology is assumed to be an emission-saving technical change, and is thus labeled as the 
“clean” technology. These two technologies differ in the fixed production cost and cost 
share of emission permit. Production with the upgraded clean technology requires total 
fixed costs of = + > 0c df f f  but reduces the cost share of emission permits.  
Output produced via technology { }∈ ,j c d  (where c  refers to the clean 
technology and d  labels the dirty technology) employs labor as a primary input and 
generates emission as a byproduct, which is treated as an additional production input 
following Copeland and Taylor’s technique (1994). The production function is written as:1  
(1) ϕ= ( , )j jq F e l  
where l  is variable labor input; e  denotes pollution emissions; and ϕ  indexes the 
firm-specific productivity. The production function ( , )jF e l  is increasing, concave, and 
homogeneous of degree one in e  and l . Concavity is a conventional curvature 
assumption on the production function. The property of homogeneity of degree one implies 
equality between the marginal cost and per-unit cost functions, which in turn guarantees 
that the relative input demand across productivity preserves the same structure as the 
relative revenue across productivity. This feature makes derivations tractable.  
To model the underlying incentive for all firms to consider and possibly adopt 
“greener” technologies—which in the real world is related to a number of federal and state 
regulations, as well as consumer preferences—here we postulate that each firm must 
purchase emission permits from the domestic government to emit the equivalent amounts 
                                                 
1 There exists an underlying pollution abatement technology behind the production 
technology. 
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of pollution. Given the common wage rate w  and permit price ep , the variable cost 
function corresponding to the production function (1) is:  
(2) ϕ
ϕ
=
( , )
( , , ) j j ej e
q c w p
C w p  
where ϕ( , )j ec w p  is the marginal cost of production with technology j . As always, 
( , )j ec w p is increasing and concave in input prices.  
Preferences across differentiated varieties produced in the single industry have the 
standard Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form, with an elasticity of substitution of 
σ ρ= − >1 (1 ) 1  as we assume ρ ∈ (0,1) . As a result of monopolistic competition à la 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), for any variety v  the iso-elastic form of residual demand in the 
home market, denoted by vhq , and that in the export market, denoted by vxq , can be 
written as functions of aggregate price indices ∗( , )P P , aggregate expenditure indices 
∗( , )R R , as well as the individual variety’s prices ( , )vh vxp p :  
(3) 
( )
( )
( )
σ
σ
σ σ
−∗ ∗−
= =
1
1
;vh vx
vh vx
R PRPq q
p p
 
where the first subscript v  indexes variety, and the second subscript { , }h x  represents the 
home and export market, respectively. 
2.2. Firm Behavior 
Each firm with the firm-specific productivity ϕ  faces the home and export residual 
demand functions with a constant elasticity of σ > 1  defined in equation (3). Under CES 
preferences, the profit maximizing price is a constant markup over marginal costs. Hence, 
due to symmetry, prices charged by firms will depend upon productivity ( )ϕ , the firm 
choice of technique (clean or dirty), but not upon variety. Hence, hereafter we drop the 
subscript indexing variety. However, since cost depends upon technique choice, we 
introduce the subscript { }∈ ,j c d  to denote the choice of clean and dirty technology, 
respectively. Optimal prices and outputs across markets are thus given by: 
(4) 
τ
ϕ ϕ
ρϕ ρϕ
= =( ) ; ( )j jjh jx
c c
p p  
(5) 
σ σ
σ σρϕ ρϕϕ ϕ
τ τ
− −   = =   
   
1 * * 1( ) ; ( ) ( )jh jx
j j
q RP q R P
c c
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Firms charge a higher price in the export market than in the home market because 
of the extra trade variable costs. Note that ≡ ( , )j j ec c w p  is a function of endogenous input 
prices. Revenues earned from each market are:  
(6) 
σ σ
σ σρϕ ρϕϕ ϕ
τ
− −
− −   = =   
   
1 1
1 * * 1( ) ; ( ) ( )jh jx
j j
r RP r R P
c c
 
Using Shephard’s Lemma, firm’s variable labor and emission permit input demands, 
depending on technology choice, are:   
(7) 
ρ ρ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ= =( ) ( ); ( ) ( )
l l
j j
jh jh jx jx
s s
l r l r
w w
 
(8) 
ρ ρ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ= =( ) ( ); ( ) ( )
e e
j j
jh jh jx jx
e e
s s
e r e r
p p
 
where 
∂
∂
≡ j e
e j
c pe
j p cs  and 
∂
∂
≡ j
j
cl w
j w cs  denote the cost shares of emission permits and of labor, 
respectively. By the cost function’s properties, + = 1e lj js s , { }∀ ∈ ,j c d .  
We separate each firm’s profits into components from sales in the home and export 
markets to make the derivation tractable. The entire fixed production cost and fixed export 
cost are apportioned to the home profit π ϕ( )jh and to the export profitπ ϕ( )jx , respectively. 
So the profit earned from each market is given by: 
(9) 
σ
σϕ ρπ ϕ ϕ
σ σ
−
− = − = − 
 
1
1( )( ) jhjh j j
j
r R Pwf wf
c
 
(10) 
σ
σϕ ρπ ϕ ϕ
σ σ τ
−
− = − = − 
 
1* *
1( )( ) jxjx x x
j
r R Pwf wf
c
 
2.3. Sorting Pattern 
The decisions firms make about whether to stay in the market, which technology to adopt, 
and whether to export, depend upon firm productivity as well as exogenous factors. Thus, 
there exist three productivity cutoffs: (i) the zero-profit productivity cutoff for adopting the 
dirty technology, denoted by ϕd , above which firms enter the market and adopt the dirty 
technology; (ii) the zero-profit productivity cutoff of exporting, denoted by ϕx , above 
which firms select to export; and (iii) the equivalent-profit productivity cutoff of upgrading 
to the clean technology, denoted by ϕc , above which firms choose to upgrade to the 
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cleaner technology.2 This partitioning of firms depends upon the various fixed costs, the 
cost of emission permits, and the variable trade costs. With appropriate assumptions on 
these costs, all clean firms serve both the home and export markets, while only a fraction of 
dirty firms select to export, that is ϕ ϕ ϕ< <d x c .
3 
2.4. Environmental Performance 
Differences in emission intensity (measured by emissions per output) between exporters and 
non-exporters are the primary focus of this paper. Consider two firms, one with 
productivity parameter ϕ′  that adopts the clean technology and exports, and the other 
with productivity ϕ′′  that uses the dirty technology and does not export. Then the relative 
emission intensity across export status and technology choice can be derived from equations 
(4)-(8) to yield:  
(11) [ ] [ ]

σ
σ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ τ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕτ
−
−
′ ′ ′ ′   + + ′′+ Λ  = × ×    ′′ ′′ ′+ Λ     
 
ProductivityMarket Size Technology     Effect    Effect      Effect
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
( ) ( ) 1
e
ch cx ch cx c c
edh dh d d
e e q q c s
e q c s
 
where σ σ∗ ∗ − −Λ ≡ 1 1( )R P RP denotes the relative foreign market potential, the ratio of 
foreign market potential to home market potential. This market potential index is decreasing 
in the market crowding ( σ−1P ) but increasing in the aggregate expenditure (Okubo, 2009). 
The right hand side of equation (11) can be decomposed into three effects that are labeled 
the “market size effect,” the “technology effect,” and the “productivity effect.”  
The market size effect is reflected by the production expansion as a result of the 
export decision. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the relative foreign market potential raises the 
market size effect. This effect is always greater than one as long as the iceberg trade cost 
exceeds one, that is τ > 1 . If τ = 1 , the market size effect equals one but the size of 
emissions still differs across markets unless the two countries are identical. If the two 
countries are identical, the aggregate variables would be the same across countries. As a 
consequence, the market size effect only depends upon the trade variable cost τ . 
The technology effect is represented by the emission-saving benefit from the clean 
                                                 
2 The derivation of productivity cutoffs and the characteristics of steady-state equilibrium, 
which are not critical for the empirical estimation that follows, are omitted. Details are 
provided in Cui (2012). 
 
3 With different assumptions on parameters and cost structure, one could also find 
ϕ ϕ ϕ< <d c x . 
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technology. The clean technology has lower marginal costs relative to the dirty technology, 
i.e., <c dc c  , due to the factor-augmenting feature of the clean technology . This effect is 
less than one ( <e ec c d dc s c s ), if the clean technology is also an emission-saving technique 
change relative to the dirty technology.4  
The productivity effect is associated with relative productivity differences. The 
higher the productivity, the lower the emission intensity (and labor utilization) will be. Both 
the technology and productivity effects contribute to emission intensity reductions, but the 
market size effect leads to more emissions.  
The firm-level relationship between export status and pollution intensity in equation 
(11) provides theoretical guidance for the empirical investigation. Due to a lack of detailed 
trade and technology information at the firm level, the available data do not allow us to 
directly estimate the separate effects of market size, technology, and productivity. 
Alternatively, there are two main testable propositions implied by the theoretical model: (i) 
that emission intensity is inversely related to productivity; and (ii) that exporting status is 
negatively correlated with emission intensity, assuming the technology and productivity 
effects together dominate the market size effect.  
Heterogeneous firms within the same industry are expected to demonstrate the 
above two negative correlations. Nevertheless, the expression in equation (11) also provides 
novel insights on the relative emission intensity across industries. The specific productivity 
cutoffs are likely to vary across industries as the underlying technology and fixed costs are 
industry specific. Heterogeneity in trade costs across industries, as it impacts the market size 
affect, will also impact the relationship between emission intensity and export status.  
Industries which are subject to lower transportation costs are more likely to actively engage 
in the export market compared with those with prohibitive trade costs. These 
heterogeneous industry-specific effects will be controlled in the empirical analysis when it 
comes to examining export decisions. But before turning to the empirical work, we discuss 
relevant environmental regulations and the data we use in the next two sections.  
3. The Clean Air Act 
The data and analysis in the paper relate to the implementation and changes in the Clean Air 
                                                 
4 As shown in Cui (2012), the technology effect is emission-saving, that is e ec ds s< , if the 
clean technology is labor-biased technique change relative to the dirty technology. The 
technology effect is labor-saving, that is e ec ds s> , if the clean technology is emission-biased 
technique change relative to the dirty technology. 
10 
 
Act, and thus a brief review of this regulation may be desirable at this juncture. The Clean 
Air Act, initially passed in 1970 and amended in 1977 and 1990 (the CAAA hereafter), 
requires the EPA to classify each county in the United States into pollutant-specific 
nonattainment and attainment categories based upon the ambient concentrations of four 
criteria air pollutants: i.e., SO2, CO, O3, and TSPs. Under the 1977 amendments, each July, 
the pollutant-specific nonattainment/attainment designation is officially reclassified for 
every U.S. county under the national standards for each criteria pollutant.  
When a county is designated as nonattainment, the state where it is located is 
required to develop a State Implementation Plan, which lays out specific regulations for 
every major source of each pollutant for which the county is in nonattainment. Existing 
facilities located in the county are subject to reasonably available control technology which 
usually involves retrofitting existing equipment, whereas new facilities are exposed to the 
“lowest achievable emission rate”(LAER), requiring the installation of the cleanest available 
technology. The 1977 amendments added the requirement that new facilities could be 
required to purchase pollution offsets from existing facilities. In contrast, when a county is 
in attainment, existing facilities are not subject to any technological standards. Only new 
facilities with the potential to emit over 100 tons per year of a criteria pollutant, classified as 
class A polluters, are required to comply with the “best available control technology” 
standard, a weaker standard than the LAER. New small facilities in attainment counties are 
exempt from the regulation. 
3.1. Effects of Regulation 
From the foregoing it follows that new and existing facilities are each exposed to more 
stringent regulations in nonattainment counties relative to attainment ones, while new small 
facilities in attainment counties are exempt from the regulation. Additionally, non-polluters 
are free from the regulation in both sets of counties. Consequently, county nonattainment 
designation is adopted as a proxy for a facility’s exposure to stringent environmental 
regulation. There exist potentially three sources of variations in facilities’ exposure to 
nonattainment designation. First, the regulation is pollutant-specific and only applies to 
polluting facilities located in nonattainment counties, providing a natural cross-section 
variation in the exposure to nonattainment regulation. Second, every year each county’s 
attainment/nonattainment designations are reclassified. Consequently, an individual facility’s 
exposure to this regulation may change over time. Third, the exposure to a regulatory 
program within attainment counties varies across facilities, because new large polluters are 
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subject to more stringent regulation than smaller ones.  
4. Data 
The unique detailed facility-level emission data on criteria air pollutants and facility 
characteristics that we have compiled pertains to the U.S. manufacturing industry in years 
2002, 2005, and 2008. A “facility” is a place where economic activities that result in air 
emissions occur. Facility emission data are obtained from the NEI database of the U.S. EPA, 
and facility economic characteristics are taken from the NETS Database. These two 
databases are matched through the DUNS number assigned by Dun and Bradstreet to 
identify unique business establishments. The regulatory attainment/nonattainment county 
status information is obtained from the Green Book Nonattainment Areas for Criteria 
Pollutants reported by the EPA.5 A list of variables and data sources used in the paper is 
summarized in table A1 in the appendix. 
For each criteria air pollutant that we track, the Green Book indicates whether only 
part of a county or the whole county is in nonattainment. We assign a county to the 
nonattainment category for each of four criteria pollutants, i.e., SO2, CO, O3,6 and TSPs,7 
if the entire county or part of the county is designated as nonattainment status. 
The NETS database, developed through a joint venture with Dun and Bradstreet by 
Walls and Associates, is a truly unique business establishment database covering over 300 
fields and 40 million unique establishments on a national basis for every year since 1990. 
The data acquired for this study include establishment name, number of employees, value of 
sales, an export indicator, the DUNS number, geographic location (i.e., latitude and 
longitude), zip code, and five-digit Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) county 
code. 
The EPA’s NEI database contains information about facilities that emit criteria air 
                                                 
5 For detailed information, see http://www.epa.gov/air/oaqps/greenbk/index.html. 
 
6 The formation of ground-level ozone is a complicated chemical process that involves 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and oxide of nitrogen (NOx) when these two react in 
the presence of sunlight. There are separate standards for NO2, 1-hour O3, and 8-hour O3. 
We classify a county as nonattainment for O3 if it is in nonattainment for NOx or O3, 
including both 1-hour and 8-hour standards. Therefore, the pollution of VOCs and NOx is 
associated with this combined O3 nonattainment designation. 
 
7 There exist separate standards for PM10 and PM2.5. We classify a county as 
nonattainment for TSPs if it is in nonattainment for at least one of these standards. TSPs in 
this study are primary particulates matters (the sum of primary PM10 and primary PM2.5). 
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pollutants for all areas of the United States. Since 2002, it releases an updated version of the 
NEI database every three years. The facility-level NEI database acquired for this empirical 
study includes emission data for four criteria air pollutants, i.e., SO2, CO, O3, and TSPs, in 
years 2002, 2005 and 2008.8 
4.1. Data Matching 
The data matching work consists of two main procedures. First, we match polluting facilities 
within the NEI database across years, and then retrieve DUNS numbers for these polluters 
from the Facility Registry System (FRS) of the EPA. Second, we match them with those 
appearing in the NETS database through the DUNS number. 
The 2002 and 2005 NEI databases assign each polluting facility a unique NEI site 
ID, whereas the 2008 NEI data uses a different facility identifier called Emission Inventory 
System (EIS) ID. To match these NEI databases across sample years, we retrieve facility 
FRS ID from the FRS of the EPA. The FRS is a centrally-managed database that identifies 
facilities, sites, or places subject to environmental regulations or of environmental interests. 
EZ Query in the FRS provides data download options for a customized list of facilities, 
which are associated with NEI or EIS programs.9 The data obtained from the EZ Query 
include three different facility identifiers: FRS ID uniquely assigned by the FRS, NEI site ID 
assigned by the NEI, and EIS facility ID assigned by the EIS.10 With the FRS ID, facility 
DUNS numbers are retrieved separately through the Facility Registry System Query.11 In 
the end, the facility-level emission dataset we compiled contains criteria air emissions, 
facility name, FIPS county code, zip code, SIC code, facility FRS ID, and DUNS number. 
In the next step, we match polluting facilities in the NEI database with those that 
appear in the NETS Database through the DUNS number. The EPA does not provide 
further information about how DUNS numbers are reported for polluting facilities and why 
                                                 
8 A more detailed discussion of the facility-level NEI database is provided in the appendix, 
which also discusses some caveats (in particular as they relate to the 2005 data).  
 
9 For EZ Query, see http://www.epa.gov/enviro/html/fii/ez.html. 
 
10 With NEI site ID contained in the FRS, we are able to match all polluting facilities in the 
NEI database with those in the FRS through the NEI site ID between years 2002 and 2005. 
However, around 7 percent of the 2008 NEI database in the manufacturing industry does 
not have records in the FRS. These observations are dropped in the study. 
 
11 For Facility Registry System Query, please refer to 
http://www.epa.gov/enviro/html/fii/fii_query_java.html. 
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some of them have missing DUNS numbers in the dataset.12 A pair of facilities from each 
source is considered as a match if the following series of criteria are satisfied. They share the 
same DUNS number and are located in the same area in terms of five-digit zip code and 
five-digit FIPS county code.13 More importantly, for each pair, we compare their facility 
names from each source to ensure the match. 
In the matched dataset, it turns out that the number of polluting facilities with zero 
emissions drops dramatically across years, while the number of polluting facilities with 
missing values for emission increases accordingly, suggesting a conflation of the two 
(conceptually distinct) statuses. This pattern actually exists in the original facility-level NEI 
database prior to matching. We drop from further consideration facilities that show missing 
values for the emission of all pollutants considered here; and, because the distinction 
between non-emitting facilities from those for which the data are missing does not appear 
very credible in this dataset, we also drop those facilities with zero emission values for all 
pollutants. 
The foregoing matching procedure narrows down our dataset to 16,695 polluting 
facilities (i.e., with a nonzero emission value for at least one pollutant) in year 2002, 12,022 
polluting facilities in year 2005, and 10,144 polluters in 2008, all in the U.S. manufacturing 
industry as determined by having a four-digit SIC code between 2000 and 4000. That is 
roughly half of polluters in the manufacturing industry reported in the NEI database prior 
to matching.14  
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Our merged dataset consists of an unbalanced panel of polluting facilities in years 2002, 
2005, and 2008, for a total of 38,861 facility-by-year observations from 18,743 facilities 
located in 2,027 U.S. counties. There are 7,663 facilities surviving throughout the study 
period.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics on a number of variables. The value of sales is 
                                                 
12 Due to an incomplete report on DUNS numbers in the FRS, approximately 80 percent of 
polluting facilities in the manufacturing industry collected in the NEI database have 
associated DUNS numbers. 
 
13 In the NEI database, a small fraction of polluting facilities does not report a complete 
five-digit zip code. In that case, we will only match their FIPS county code. 
 
14 Prior to data matching, the NEI database contains 25,574 manufacturing polluters in 
2002, 20,948 in 2005, and 21,102 in 2008. 
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deflated by the annual total manufacturing industry Producer Price Index (PPI) provided by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.15 It is worth noting that each facility emits at least one 
pollutant, but not all facilities have emissions reports for all four criteria air pollutants. In 
many cases, facilities only have estimates for one pollutant in the NEI database. In addition, 
the dataset contains some observations with extremely low emissions, which do not appear 
credible.16 These outliers, which only account for a small fraction of total relevant 
observations, were dropped from the analysis and are not included in table 1.17 
The last two columns of table 1 summarize the differences between exporters and 
non-exporters across facility characteristics. Exporters are larger than non-exporters in 
terms of sale and number of employees. These descriptive results are in line with the 
growing empirical trade literature on heterogeneous firms. When it comes to environmental 
performance, exporters emit more SO2, O3, and TSPs, but less CO than non-exporters. 
Pollution intensity measured by emissions per value of sales (tons per thousand dollars), 
however, is lower for exporters relative to non-exporters for all criteria air pollutants. The 
differences are persistent for each sample year separately. 
Figures A1 – A4 in the supplementary appendix report a series of U.S. maps 
indicating geographic locations of polluting exporters and non-exporters on a 
pollutant-by-pollutant basis.18 The pink points indicate polluting non-exporters, the light 
green points refer to polluting exporters, and the yellow areas represent pollutant-specific 
nonattainment counties. According to the Green Book reported by the EPA, in 2002 only a 
small number of the total of 3,143 U.S. counties were designated as nonattainment: 21 
counties in SO2 nonattainment, 19 counties in CO nonattainment, 251 counties in O3 
                                                 
15 The PPI by SIC industry data is not complete for the study period. Hence the deflator 
used in the paper is for the total manufacturing industries. 
 
16 For example, the smallest facility-level nonzero value of SO2 in the data was −× 102.1 10
tons per year, that is 0.21 micrograms per year (a microgram is equal to one billionth of one 
kilogram). 
 
17 Specifically, we adopted the threshold of 0.001 tons per year (i.e., one kilogram) for 
inclusion in the analysis. The fraction of observations with annual emissions less than 0.001 
tons per year are as follows: 7.73 percent for SO2, 1.22 percent for CO, 0.49 percent for O3, 
and 1.81 percent for TSPs. Empirical estimation with these outliers is considered but not 
reported in the paper. Accounting for the outliers does not change the empirical results in 
any significant way. 
 
18 Polluting facilities located in the State of Alaska and State of Hawaii are not shown in the 
figures, but do exist in the merged dataset. 
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nonattainment, and 64 counties in TSPs nonattainment. In year 2005, the number of 
counties with SO2 or CO nonattainment designations declines to 12 and 11, respectively, 
while the number of counties with O3 or TSPs nonattainment status increases drastically to 
431 and 259, respectively. In 2008, the number of counties with O3 nonattainment status 
substantially dropped from 431 to 293, the number of counties with other nonattainment 
status changes slightly. Most nonattainment counties are covered in our merged dataset. 
Table 2 summarizes the number of polluting facilities across exporting status and 
pollutant-specific county status for each criteria air pollutant. For example, there are 239 
SO2 polluters residing in the SO2-specific nonattainment counties in the sample period, and 
60 of them are exporters. Several key patterns emerge from table 2. First, only a very small 
fraction of SO2 emitters are subject to extra environmental compliance costs associated with 
the SO2-specific pollution abatement activities. Similarly, a small number of CO emitters are 
located in counties which are in CO nonattainment, and roughly six percent of exporting 
CO emitters are in CO nonattainment counties during the study period. Finally, a substantial 
fraction of O3 and TSPs polluters are located in the relevant pollutant-specific 
nonattainment counties, and are thus exposed to the corresponding regulation requiring 
considerable efforts in abating the pollution. 
5. Empirics 
By using the data discussed in the foregoing section, we test the two main predictions 
derived from the theoretical model: first, that productivity is inversely related to emission 
intensity; second, that there exists a negative correlation between export status and emission 
intensity. We begin by estimating the facility-level productivity as the residual of a 
production function regression. Given the estimated facility productivity, we then 
investigate the impact of export status on emission intensity on a pollutant-by-pollutant 
basis, controlling for facility and industry characteristics. 
5.1. Productivity Measures 
Plant-level productivity measures are notoriously difficult to perform. This is particularly the 
case when one relies on NETS data, as we do, because this database lacks information about 
capital stock or investment levels. The challenge is to derive a meaningful estimate of 
facility-level productivity with the data on hand. A key ingredient of our procedure is to 
assume that all firms in the same industry use the same technology (although they are 
heterogeneous with respect to productivity), and that this technology can be represented by 
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a homogeneous production function. More specifically, the production function that applies 
to a facility i  in industry j  at time t  is written as  
(12) ( )ϕ= ,ijt ijt j ijt ijtq h l x  
where ijtq  represents output, ijtl  denotes labor, ijtx  is a vector of all other inputs used 
in production, and the parameter ϕijt  represents the facility-specific productivity. Note 
that this productivity parameter measures a facility’s productivity deviation from the 
industry average productivity (which is subsumed in the industry-specific production 
function). Assuming that the production function is homogeneous of degree κ j , equation 
(12) can be alternatively written as:19 
(13) ( )κϕ= ( ) 1,jijt ijt ijt j ijt ijtq l h lx  
where the degree of homogeneity κ j  of the production function measures the 
industry-specific degree of returns to scale (which, in the context of the theoretical model 
presented earlier, can be either increasing or decreasing).
  
This reformulation of the production function is useful because it separates the 
plant-level labor input ijtl , which is observable in our data, from the input ratios ijt ijtlx  
(e.g., the capital/labor ratio) which we do not observe. If we now assume that all firms 
within the same industry face the same input prices, then the maintained assumption that all 
firms in the same industry have a common and homogeneous production function (apart 
from their individual productivity parameter) leads to the conclusion that all firms in the 
same industry would select the same input ratios ijt ijtlx  as a result of cost minimization.
20 
This suggests that the unobservable component (1, )j ijt ijth lx  in equation (13) can be 
proxied by industry-specific variables. Hence, we use three-digit SIC industry dummies to 
proxy this industry-specific component, so that estimation is conducted by using the 
following specification:  
(14) θ κ λ= + × +∑ ∑SIC SIC +Residuallog( ) log( )ijt j j j j ijt t ijt
j j
q l  
where ijtq  is measured by the value of sales, ijtl  is measured by the numbers of 
                                                 
19 Recall that, for a function ( )f z  that is homogeneous of degree κ , then κ=( ) ( )f tz t f z , 
∀ > 0t . 
 
20 The homogeneity of the production function, in particular, ensures that cost-minimizing 
input ratios depend only on price ratios and are not affected by the scale of output. 
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employees, SIC j  denotes a three-digit SIC dummy variable which equals one if the facility 
belongs to industry j  and zero otherwise, λt  is a year-specific coefficient controlling for 
possible common time trend. Residualijt  is an error term that contains the unobserved 
heterogeneous productivity parameter ϕijt , which reflects the deviation of facility i’s 
productivity from its industry average, as well as other possible explanatory factors which 
are not covered in the regression. 
Given the foregoing, the (exogenous) heterogeneous facility-level productivity 
parameter of interest is recovered from the estimated residuals of equation (14), that is  
(15) ϕ θ κ λ≡ − − × −∑ ∑SIC SICˆ ˆˆ ˆlog( ) log( ) log( )ijt ijt j j j j ijt t
j j
q l  
Note that the results from estimating equation (14), in addition to providing an estimate of 
the facility-level productivity parameter, also yield an estimate of the coefficient of returns to 
scale κˆ j (assumed to be the same for all facilities in the same three-digit SIC industry). 
5.2. Emission Intensity 
To assess the impact of export status on emission intensity, conditional on the estimated 
facility-level productivity and industry characteristics, we consider the following regression 
model:  
(16) γ γ γ γ θ λ ε= + + + + + +E Exp Prod Reg0 1 2 3ipt i ijt ipt j t ijt  
where i  indexes a facility, j  indicates the industry, p  refers to a pollutant, and t  
references a year. In (16), θ j  is an industry-specific coefficient that controls for the 
variations of production and pollution abatement technologies across three-digit SIC 
industry, λt  is a year-specific coefficient controlling for time trend, and ε ijt  is the 
stochastic error term. 
The outcome of interest, Eipt , is the (log of) facility i’s emission intensity measured 
by emissions per value of sales (tons per dollars). Expi  is a time-invariant export indicator 
that equals one if the facility exports and zero otherwise. ϕ≡Prod ˆlog( )ijt ijt  denotes facility 
productivity, relative to its industry average, measured as TFP estimated in equation (14). 
Reg ipt  measures a facility’s environmental regulatory pressure, as proxied by an indicator 
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variable relating to nonattainment status for the county where the facility is located.21 The 
construction of Reg ipt  varies with types of polluting facilities examined in the specification. 
For each pollutant { }∈ SO CO,O TSPs2 3, ,p , it equals one if the facility emits that pollutant 
and is located in the pollutant p -specific nonattainment county at time − 1t , and zero 
otherwise.  
To test the model pollutant-by-pollutant, the emission intensity is computed for 
each criteria air pollutant. This pollutant-specific regression examines the relationship 
between exporting likelihood and emission intensity among facilities emitting the same 
pollutant and within the same industry, which is captured by the main parameter of interest 
γ1 . Another interest of this paper lies in ascertaining whether facility productivity is 
inversely related to emission intensity, as predicted by the productivity effect in the 
theoretical model. This is measured by the estimated value of γ 2  in the above regressions. 
5.3. Results 
As discussed earlier, the estimated productivity measures are obtained from estimating the 
model in equation (14) using the full sample of the merged data, which consists of 38,861 
facility-by-year observations from 18,743 facilities. The fit of the model is good, with an 
adjusted 2R  of 0.90. Our interest in this model centers on the estimated residuals. Because 
in our approach the facility-level productivity estimates are unconstrained (i.e., they can 
differ for the same facility across the three years of our sample), some validation of the 
procedure is provided by inspecting the correlation of estimated productivity parameters for 
the same facility across years. As expected, productivity estimates display a fairly strong 
correlation: 0.84 for 2002-2005, 0.76 for 2002-2008 and 0.89 for 2005-2008. This result is 
illustrated in figure 2, which provides scatter plots of TFP estimates for the same facility 
across years, specifically 2002-2005 and 2002-2008 (the picture for 2005-2008, omitted for 
space reasons, is similar). The estimated 136 coefficients of the SIC dummies that are 
obtained from equation (14) are omitted for space reasons, as are the 136 estimated 
coefficients κˆ j . The latter, however, are of some independent interest because, in the logic 
                                                 
21 Hence, all facilities in the same county are assume to face the same regulatory pressure. 
Here, a county’s attainment/non-attainment status is defined with reference to year 1t − . 
Because county nonattainment/attainment status is officially reclassified every July, the 
one-year lag presumably more closely captures the compliance cost requirements facing a 
plant in a given year than using the contemporaneous status. 
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of our simple specification, they can be interpreted as estimates of the industry-specific 
coefficients of returns to scales. The distribution of these estimates, which show a mean 
1.021 and a standard deviation of 0.075, is depicted in figure 1. Thus, on average, these 
estimates are close to representing constant returns to scale, although the hypothesis of 
κ = ∀0 ˆ: 1 ,jH j  is rejected at the 1 percent significance level.  
Table 3 presents the results of the OLS estimation in equation (16) on a 
pollutant-by-pollutant basis. The columns correspond to various pollutants. The sample size 
of polluting facilities varies with pollutant type. All columns include a set of three-digit SIC 
dummies and year dummies as noted at the bottom of the table. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis.22 As noted earlier, the regulatory variable Reg ipt  is meant to 
capture the impacts of a pollutant-specific nonattainment designation on the relevant 
polluting facilities. 
The estimated effect of nonattainment designations on pollution intensity is negative 
and significant at the 1 percent level for all pollutants considered in the paper, except for the 
SO2 nonattainment designation. These negative impacts of pollutant-specific designations 
suggest that strict regulatory controls have beneficial effects on reducing emission intensity. 
The estimated coefficients show that polluters located in nonattainment counties have 
pollution intensity emissions that are from 48 percent lower (TSPs) to 57 percent lower (CO) 
than for facilities located in attainment areas. Surprisingly, a positive and significant SO2 
regulatory impact suggests that SO2 emitters located in the relevant nonattainment counties 
pollute roughly 95 percent more SO2 per unit sales than those free from the regulation. This 
finding should be interpreted with caution, since the merged dataset lacks enough 
observations of SO2 polluters located in SO2-specific nonattainment counties.23 
Of greater interest is the relationship between productivity and emission intensity. 
The estimated coefficient on productivity is negative and highly significant at the 1 percent 
level for all pollutants, confirming the theoretical prediction that productivity is inversely 
related to the emission intensity. The estimated elasticity of emission intensity with respect 
                                                 
22 Alternative specifications of standard errors (i.e., cluster at industry level, county level, or 
facility level) are considered but not reported in the paper. These specifications do not alter 
the estimates in any significant way. 
 
23 A small number of U.S. counties are in SO2 nonattainment status in the study period (23 
counties in 2001, 15 counties in 2004, and 9 counties in 2007), and only a very small fraction 
of SO2 polluting facilities residing in these nonattainment counties are covered in the 
merged dataset (162 out of 8,424 in year 2001, 59 out of 6,303 in year 2004, and 18 out of 
5,578 in 2007). 
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to productivity, reflected byγ 2 , ranges from -0.71 to -0.96, depending upon the pollutant 
type. Among all pollutants reported in the paper, SO2 has the highest elasticity, suggesting 
that a one percent increase in productivity of SO2 polluters leads to approximately a 0.96 
percent decrease in SO2 emissions per value of sales. 
Of central interest of this paper isγ1 , the coefficient on the export indicator. The 
estimates consistently show negative correlations between export status and emission 
intensity for all four criteria air pollutants tracked in the paper, after controlling for other 
relevant determinants. These negative impacts are significant at the 1 percent level for all 
pollutants. The empirical findings are in line with the theoretical prediction that exporting 
status is negatively correlated with emission intensity. Exporters emit less pollution per sales 
than non-exporters by around 22 percent of SO2 and CO, 21 percent of O3, and 25 percent 
of TSPs. 
5.4. Corroborating evidence 
To further validate our model, it is of some interest to examine how the facilities’ export 
status is related to the estimated TFP productivity measure. According to the theoretical 
model, export status is endogenous, depending upon productivity, trade variable costs and 
other cost parameters. Furthermore, ceteris paribus, in our model export status should be 
positively correlated with productivity. To investigate this property, we seek proxies of trade 
cost variables. Two proxies employed in this study are facility-specific and industry-specific 
trade variable costs. The former is measured by the geographical distance of each polluting 
facility to its nearest U.S. port, and the latter is measured by the ad valorem freight rate at the 
four-digit SIC industry level.24 The geographic distance reflects the costs associated with 
transportation of goods from manufacturing sites to the port of shipment. The freight rate, 
constructed by Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), is the markup of the 
Cost-Insurance-Freight (CIF) value over the Free-on-Board (FOB) value relative to the 
FOB. This industry-specific freight rate serves as a proxy of the iceberg trade costs 
associated with ocean or inland waterway transport of the goods to the port of destination. 
These two measures together are considered as proxies of trade variable costs.  
With the estimated heterogeneous productivity from (14), we employ a logistic 
model to estimate the probability of selecting to export conditional on the estimated facility 
                                                 
24 According to IHS Global Services, U.S. seaborne trade with the rest of the world 
accounts for 78.05 percent by volume (millions of metric tons), and 48.47 percent by value 
of total U.S. trade (billions of dollars) in year 2008. 
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productivity, two measures of trade variable costs, and exposure to environmental 
regulations, controlling for industry characteristics. Regardless of pollutant type, the logistic 
regression is specified as follows: 
(17)
( )γ γ γ γ γ θ λ ε= = + + + + + + +∑Exp Distance Freight Prod Reg0 1 2 3 4Pr( 1)i i jt ijt p ipt j t ijtpF  
where ⋅( )F  denotes the logistic function. Variables Expi , Prodijt  and Reg ipt  were 
defined earlier. Distancei  denotes the distance (in thousands of miles) of a polluting facility 
to its nearest U.S. port. The World Port Source online database provides geographic 
locations (i.e., latitude and longitude) of a total of 548 U.S. ports including harbor, river port, 
seaport, off-shore terminal, and pier, jetty or wharf.25 For each polluting facility, we 
compute its distance to all 548 U.S. ports based on the “Haversine” formula, given the 
latitude and longitude of two points,26 then pick the shortest distance as the distance to the 
nearest port. Freight jt  indexes the freight rate at four-digit SIC industry level. The 
industry-level data on CIF and FOB are acquired from the online data source of U.S. 
Manufacturing Exports and Imports compiled by Peter Schott (2010).27 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for equation (17). These results are 
supportive of our approach and consistent with the prediction of our theoretical model.28 
First, a positive and statistically significant coefficient of the productivity regressor indicates 
that the higher productivity a facility has, the more likely it is to export. Second, the 
estimated coefficients of distance to port are negative and significant at the 1 percent level. 
As facilities residing closer to ports are likely to have lower costs associated with 
transporting the goods from manufacturing sites to the ports of shipment, they are more 
likely to engage in the export market. As for the impact of freight rates on the export 
decisions, facilities in industries with lower freights rates tend to be more likely to export, as 
shown by the negative coefficient. However, it is not statistically significant. Lastly, three of 
                                                 
25 For detailed information, please see: http://www.worldportsource.com/states.php. 
 
26 The “Haversine” formula calculates the great-circle distance between two points, that is, 
the shortest distance over the earth’s surface. 
 
27 The 2008 industry-level CIF and FOB data, which are not provided in Schott (2010), are 
simply taken from year 2005.  
 
28 The number of observations drops as compared with the number in table 3 because the 
Schott (2010) data source that we are using does not contain data for all four-digit SIC 
industries. 
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the four coefficients of the nonattainment designation variables are negative (the coefficient 
for CO nonattainment is significant at the 1 percent level), suggesting that polluters subject 
to strict regulatory controls might have additional environmental burdens, and are thus less 
likely to export, than those exempt from environmental charges. 
6. Conclusion 
The theoretical model formulated in this paper sheds some light on firms’ choices of 
production techniques that have different environmental consequences, and on their 
relation with firms’ export choices. The Melitz-type model that we have developed 
postulates the existence of heterogeneous firms with varying productivity levels. The model 
predicts that a productive firm is more likely to export and to upgrade to the 
emission-saving technology than a less productive firm. The analytic expression for relative 
emissions per output across exporting status predicts two negative correlations: one 
between productivity and emissions per output, and the other between export status and 
emissions per output. This model, while interesting in its own right, also provides  
guidance for the empirical investigation of the differences between exporters and 
non-exporters in terms of environmental outcomes. 
To investigate the predictions of our model, we have assembled a large and unique 
data set for the U.S. manufacturing industry. Specifically, we have matched facility-level air 
pollution data from the U.S. EPA with facility level economic characteristics data obtained 
from NETS. The empirical analysis based on these data that we have presented provides 
support for the theoretical predictions of our model. We find robust evidence of a negative 
correlation between the estimated facility productivity and emissions per value of sales. The 
negative impact of productivity is statistically significant for each criteria air pollutant we 
track. More importantly, we find that exporting facilities tend to have less emission per value 
of sales than competing non-exporters within the same industry, conditional on estimated 
productivity and on exposure to the CAAA. The paper also provides evidence (for the cases 
of CO, O3, and TSPs) that facilities located in pollutant-specific nonattainment counties 
pollute less than other firms. Consistent with the structure of the model, we also find that 
facilities with higher estimated productivity are also more likely to export. 
These empirical evidence, along with empirical work that identifies impacts of trade 
liberalization on technology adoption (Bustos, 2011), have some policy implications. Clearly, 
the optimal response to pollutants that have global consequences is an internationally 
coordinated effort to reduce those pollutants through pollution taxes or “cap and trade” 
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programs. Yet, for a wide variety of reasons, efforts to achieve such coordination of 
environmental policies have not been very successful. On the other hand, there is broader 
(if not complete) support for policies that liberalize trade in goods. Policies, and 
international agreements, oriented to facilitate access to foreign markets, may also affect 
aggregate emissions as the expansion of markets affects the technology adoption decisions 
of firms and alters the average productivity of industries. While there are those who fear that 
globalization will lead to further environmental degradation, the results of this paper in fact 
support for the belief that globalization, largely through its impact on firm level productivity, 
may contribute to reducing global pollution. Thus, while international trade cannot be 
construed as a substitute for environmental policies, it is also apparent that it should not be 
seen as adverse to environmental outcomes.    
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Figure 1. Histogram and Kernel Distributions of Industry Returns to Scale Coefficients 
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Figure 2. Scatter of Residuals as Productivity across Years 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max Exporter  Mean 
Non-Exporter  
Mean 
Sales (thousand $) 38,861 31120.7 77709.5 0.2 4295274.0 43339.2 27101.5 
Employees 38,861 216.7 478.2 1 15000 307.2 186.9 
SO2 (tons) 20,364 129.5 877.5 0.001 41845.2 149.3 122.4 
CO (tons) 24,053 139.8 1586.5 0.001 87428.9 121.9 146.2 
O3 (tons) 35,645 100.6 460.6 0.001 23121.4 101.2 100.4 
TSPs (tons) 29,561 40.8 197.9 0.001 11383.1 42.3 40.3 
SO2 per Sales 20,364 0.046 1.303 2.57e-09 139.5 0.010 0.059 
CO per Sales 24,053 0.058 2.631 3.37e-09 282.8 0.013 0.075 
O3 per Sales 35,645 0.038 0.847 1.76e-08 80.0 0.027 0.042 
TSPs per Sales 29,561 0.015 0.354 4.71e-09 41.3 0.008 0.017 
Export Dummy 38,861 0.25 0.43 0 1 1 0 
SO2 NA 38,861 0.01 0.09 0 1 0.008 0.009 
CO NA 38,861 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.064 0.084 
O3 NA 38,861 0.47 0.50 0 1 0.463 0.467 
TSPs NA 38,861 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.185 0.204 
Note: NA stands for Nonattainment, and is one-year lagged status. O3 is sum of NOx and VOCs, TSPs is sum of PM10-PRI and PM2.5-PRI. 
 
 
30 
 
 
Table 2. Number of Polluting Facilities 
 
 Year 2002 Year 2005 Year 2008 Year 2002, 2005, and 2008 
 Exporter Non-Exporter Exporter Non-Exporter Exporter Non-Exporter Exporter Non-Exporter 
SO2 
Nonattainment 41 121 15 44 4 14 60 179 
SO2 Attainment 2,119 6,143 1,691 4,612 1,484 4,076 5,294 14,831 
CO 
Nonattainment 260 932 128 485 0 5 388 1,422 
CO Attainment 2,308 6,476 1,871 5,089 1,726 4,773 5,905 16,338 
O3 
Nonattainment 1,598 4,818 1,544 4,577 1,096 3,189 4,238 12,584 
O3 Attainment 2,208 6,462 1,352 3,719 1,356 3,726 4,916 13,907 
TSPs 
Nonattainment 430 1,520 340 1,156 593 1,779 1,363 4,455 
TSPs Attainment 2,596 7,721 2,048 5,919 1,383 4,076 6,027 17,716 
 
Note: County-level nonattainment regulation is a one-year lagged status. Numbers in this table reflect the number of facilities located in counties 
which are nonattainment last year. 
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Table 3. Main Results: Emission Intensity 
 SO2 CO O3 TSPs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Export Status -0.249*** -0.256*** -0.234*** -0.291*** 
 (0.053) (0.036) (0.025) (0.035) 
Productivity -0.960*** -0.729*** -0.868*** -0.715*** 
 (0.041) (0.030) (0.021) (0.029) 
SO2 NA 0.668***    
 (0.231)    
CO NA  -0.858***   
  (0.056)   
O3 NA   -0.842***  
   (0.023)  
TSPs NA    -0.658*** 
    (0.036) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,364 24,053 35,645 29,561 
Adjusted R2 0.374 0.337 0.242 0.339 
Note: Dependent variable is log of emissions per value of sales. “Export Status” is export 
indicator. “Productivity” is the estimated productivity. All regressions include a set of three-digit 
SIC dummies and year dummy. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. NA stands 
for Nonattainment, all NA regulations are one-year lags. Coefficients for the regression constant 
and variables of industry and year dummies are suppressed. *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** 
significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level.    
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Table 4. Results: Probability to Export 
 All Pollutants 
Productivity 0.102*** (0.026) 
   
Distance to Port -0.395*** (0.110) 
   
Freight Rate -0.164 (0.706) 
   
SO2 NA 0.028 (0.146) 
   
CO NA -0.176*** (0.063) 
   
O3 NA -0.017 (0.032) 
   
TSPs NA -0.018 (0.043) 
   
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 32,189 
R2 0.087 
Note: Dependent variable is binary export decision. All regressions include a set of three-digit 
SIC dummies and year dummy. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. NA stands 
for Nonattainment, all NA regulations are one-year lag. Coefficients for the regression constant 
and variables of industry and year dummies are suppressed. *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** 
significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Appendix 
A.1.Description of the NEI Database 
This section provides a brief introduction of the NEI facility level emission database and 
summarized caveats of this database.  
The NEI database includes estimates of annual criteria and hazardous air pollutant 
emissions from sources in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 
Islands. Sources are divided into two large categories: stationary and mobile. The former incudes 
point and nonpoint sources, the latter consists of on-road and non-road sources. The collection 
and updating of 2002 and 2005 NEI databases follow with the Consolidated Emissions 
Reporting Rule (CERR). The 2008 NEI is compiled using the Air Emissions Reporting Rule 
(AERR), rather than its predecessor the CERR.29 For the case of point sources (polluting 
facilities) data, both reporting rules require a report on actual emissions for all facilities sites that 
emit above certain thresholds, determined by pollutant. State or local pollution control agencies 
have to comply with the requirement. They report emissions from larger point sources annually, 
and have a choice to report smaller point sources every three years or one-third of the sources 
each year. Smaller point source facilities with annual emissions below certain thresholds can be 
defined as nonpoint area sources. While states are more likely to report major sources as point 
sources and smaller sources as nonpoint sources, and EPA encourages states to submit small 
sources to the point inventory. 
Some major caveats of the NEI database pertaining to point sources can be summarized 
as follow. First, EPA developed the 2005 NEI data based on a reduced level of effort. Part of 
this reduced effort involved using some 2002 NEI data in the 2005 NEI as surrogates for 
emissions data representing 2005. The 2005 NEI database provides flag variables, “Start 
Date/End Date” fields, to indicate which data are 2005 emissions and which data are actually 
taken from 2002 emissions. Around one-third of observations in the 2005 NEI have a flag 
variable of “Start Date” referring to year 2002. When it comes to the manufacturing industry, 
roughly one-quarter of observations in 2005 are duplicates of 2002 emissions. We dropped these 
observations from our study, as their duplicate nature entails that they do not carry independent 
information. Second, the 2008 NEI database was built from emissions data in the EIS. Note that 
this 2008 database use a new facility identifier, called EIS site ID, rather than the previous NEI 
site ID. A comprehensive and updated coverage of facility identifiers may be obtained from the 
                                                 
29 For the CERR, please see http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/cerr/cerr.pdf. For the AERR, 
please refer to http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/aerr/final_published_aerr.pdf. 
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Emission Inventory System Gateway. This Gateway, however, is only available to EPA staff, EIS 
data partners responsible for submitting data to EPA, and contractors working for EPA on 
emissions related work. For this study, we rely on the FRS ID reported in the FRS of the EPA to 
match polluting facilities across sample years. All observations in 2002 and 2005 NEI databases 
have both records and FRS ID reported in the FRS, hence can be matched between these two 
years. However, one-eighth of 2008 NEI database is missing from the FRS, and roughly 7 
percent of facilities in the manufacturing industry in this database do not have any records in the 
FRS. These missing manufactures are discarded in our study. Last but not least, as noted in the 
EPA technical document (EPA, 2012), emission data for filterable and condensable components 
of particulate matter (i.e., PM10-FIL, PM2.5-FIL and PM-CON) is not complete and should not 
be used at any aggregate level. Users interested in PM emissions are suggested to only consider 
primary particulate matter, which are PM10-PRI and PM2.5-PRI. Following this suggestion, 
TSPs in our study is the sum of these two pollutants.  
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Table A1. Variable List 
Variable Definition Source 
Facility Level 
Sales Value of sales ($) NETS 
Employees Number of employees NETS 
Export Dummy Export indicator, equals 1 if exports, 0 otherwise NETS 
Distance Distance of a facility to its nearest port (miles) Calculated 
SO2 Sulfur Oxide (tons) NEI 
CO Carbon Monoxide (tons) NEI 
VOCs Volatile Organic Compounds (tons) NEI 
NOx Oxide of Nitrogen (tons) NEI 
PM10-PRI Primary particulate matter less than 10 microns (tons) NEI 
PM2.5-PRI Primary particulate matter less than 2.5 microns (tons) NEI 
TSPs Total Suspended Particulates, sum of PM10-PRI and PM2.5-PRI (tons) Calculated 
O3 Ozone, sum of VOCs and NOx (tons) Calculated 
SO2 Intensity SO2 per sales Calculated 
CO Intensity CO per sales Calculated 
O3 Intensity O3 per sales Calculated 
TSPs Intensity TSPs per sales Calculated 
County Level 
SO2 NA SO2 Nonattainment, equals 1 if nonattainment, 0 otherwise EPA 
CO NA CO Nonattainment, equals 1 if nonattainment, 0 otherwise EPA 
O3 NA O3 Nonattainment, equals 1 if nonattainment, 0 otherwise EPA 
TSPs NA TSPs Nonattainment, equals 1 if nonattainment, 0 otherwise EPA 
Industry Level at Four-Digit SIC 
CIF Cost-Insurance-Freight value of U.S. imports Peter Schott 
FOB Free-on-Board value of U.S. imports Peter Schott 
Freight Rate (CIF - FOB)/FOB Calculated 
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SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX  (not for publication, to be available online) 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1.1: SO2 Polluting Facilities, Year 2002.  
Source: U.S. EPA (NEI database).  
Note: yellow areas refer to SO2 nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points 
denote non-exporters, and blue triangles represent ports.  
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Figure A1.2: SO2 Polluting Facilities, Year 2005.  
Source: U.S. EPA (NEI database).  
Note: yellow areas refer to SO2 nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points 
denote non-exporters, and blue triangles represent ports.  
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Figure A1.3: SO2 Polluting Facilities, Year 2008.  
Source: U.S. EPA (NEI database).  
Note: yellow areas refer to SO2 nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points 
denote non-exporters, and blue triangles represent ports. 
 
39 
 
 
Figure A2.1: CO Polluting Facilities Year 2002.  
Source: U.S. EPA (NEI database).  
Note: yellow areas refer to CO nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points 
denote non-exporters, and blue triangles represent ports.  
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Figure A2.2: CO Polluting Facilities, Year 2005.  
Source: U.S. EPA (NEI database).  
Note: yellow areas refer to CO nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points 
denote non-exporters, and blue triangles represent ports.
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Figure A2.3: CO Polluting Facilities, Year 2008.  
Source: U.S. EPA (NEI database).  
Note: yellow areas refer to CO nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points 
denote non-exporters, and blue triangles represent ports. 
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Figure A3.1: O3 Polluting Facilities, Year 2002.  
Source: U.S. EPA (NEI database).  
Note: yellow areas refer to O3 nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points 
denote non-exporters, and blue triangles represent ports.  
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Figure A3.2: O3 Polluting Facilities, Year 2005.  
Source: U.S. EPA (NEI database).  
Note: yellow areas refer to O3 nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points 
denote non-exporters, and blue triangles represent ports.  
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Figure A3.3: O3 Polluting Facilities, Year 2008.  
Source: U.S. EPA (NEI database).  
Note: yellow areas refer to O3 nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points 
denote non-exporters, and blue triangles represent ports. 
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Figure A4.1: TSPs Polluting Facilities, Year 2002.  
Source: U.S. EPA (NEI database).  
Note: yellow areas refer to TSPs nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points 
denote non-exporters, and blue triangles represent ports.  
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Figure A4.2: TSPs Polluting Facilities, Year 2005.  
Source: U.S. EPA (NEI database).  
Note: yellow areas refer to TSPs nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points 
denote non-exporters, and blue triangles represent ports. 
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Figure A4.3: TSPs Polluting Facilities, Year 2008.  
Source: U.S. EPA (NEI database).  
Note: yellow areas refer to TSPs nonattainment counties, green points are exporters, pink points 
denote non-exporters, and blue triangles represent ports. 
